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MENTAL HEALTH-MENTALLY RETARDED HAVE A RIGHT TO HABILI-
TATION IN THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE ENVIRONMENT POSSIBLE.
Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hospital (1979)
On May 30, 1974, Terri Lee Halderman, a retarded resident of Penn-
hurst State School and Hospital (Pennhurst)' initiated a class action 2 on
behalf of herself and other Pennhurst residents against Pennhurst, its
superintendent, and various Pennsylvania state and county officials who were
responsible for supervising the Commonwealth's and the counties' retarda-
1. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1300 (E.D. Pa.
1977), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979) (en bane), cert. granted, 100
S. Ct. 2984 (1980). Now known as Pennhurst Center, Pennhurst is an institution owned and
operated by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for the education, training, and care of the
Commonwealth's mentally retarded residents. 446 F. Supp. at 1298. Located in Spring City,
Pennsylvania, Pennhurst housed 1,230 mentally retarded persons at the time of trial. Id. at
1302. The district court found that, since its founding in 1908, Pennhurst "has been over-
crowded and understaffed." Id. Moreover, defendants admitted at trial that, even though Penn-
hurst had undergone "tremendous improvement" in recent decades, it still did not "meet
minimum standards for the habilitation of its residents." Id. The district court further found that
[a]t its best, Pennhurst is typical of large residential state institutions for the re-
tarded. These institutions are the most isolated and restrictive settings in which to treat
the retarded. Pennhurst is almost totally impersonal. Its residents have no privacy-they
sleep in large, overcrowded wards, spend their waking hours together in large day rooms
and eat in a large group setting. They must conform to the schedule of the institution
which allows for no individual flexibility.
Id. at 1303 (footnote and citations omitted). According to the trial court,
[m]ental retardation, by definition, is an impairment in learning capacity and adap-
tive behavior. Retardation is wholly distinct from mental illness. Retarded individuals,
just as other members of society, may suffer from mental illness. Mental retardation is
primarily an educational problem and not a disease which can be cured through drugs or
treatment. However, with proper habilitation, the level of functioning of every retarded
person may be improved.
Id. at 1298 (footnotes and citations omitted). The district court also stated that " '[hiabilitation' is
the term of art used to refer to that education, training and care required by retarded individu-
als to reach their maximum development." Id. See note 20 and accompanying text infra.
2. 446 F. Supp. at 1298. The certified plaintiff class included all retarded persons who, as
of May 30, 1974, either have been, are, or may become residents of Pennhurst and all persons
residing in the five southeastern Pennsylvania counties who either are on waiting lists for
placement at Pennhurst, or, "because of the unavailability of alternate services in the commu-
nity, may be placed at Pennhurst .... " Id. at 1300. See note 94 and accompanying text infra.
The complaint charged that the conditions to which the residents were subjected at Penn-
hurst violated the class members' rights to habilitation under both state, see PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
50, §§ 4101-4704 (Purdon 1969), and federal, see 42 U.S.C. § 794 (1976); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983,
1986, 6010 (1976), statutes as well as their rights under the first, eighth, ninth, and fourteenth
amendments to the United States Constitution. 446 F. Supp. at 1300. See notes 9-10 and ac-
companying text infra. The plaintiffs sought "both damages and broad equitable relief including
the closing of Pennhurst, and mandating that the defendants provide them with education,
training and care in their respective communities." 446 F. Supp. at 1300. For a discussion of
the conditions at Pennhurst and the injuries suffered by the plaintiffs, see notes 4-8 and accom-
panying text infra.
The United States, the Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Citizens, the Parents and
Family Association of Pennhurst, and several mentally retarded residents of Pennhurst sub-
sequently moved to intervene. 446 F. Supp. at 1301.
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tion programs. 3 The complaint alleged that the Pennhurst residents lived in
inhumane and dangerous conditions 4 and were subjected to unnecessary
physical restraints 5 and dangerous medication. 6 The complaint further al-
leged that Pennhurst residents suffered numerous physical injuries resulting
from a lack of adequate supervision. 7 Moreover, the plaintiffs asserted that
inadequate habilitative programs condemned the Pennhurst residents to
3. 446 F. Supp. at 1301-02. The plaintiffs sought relief against five counties in southeastern
Pennsylvania which, pursuant to the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act,
operate Base Service Units (BSU's) which arrange for the admission of the counties' mentally
retarded citizens to Pennhurst and are responsible for evaluating the needs of the retarded
individuals and determining the appropriate habilitative services. Id. at 1313. Admission to
Pennhurst is arranged through these BSU's on the basis of either a commitment order from a
state court or a voluntary admission initiated by a parent or guardian. Id. at 1310, 1313.
In their complaint, the plaintiffs sought access to local facilities within each county, called
Community Living Arrangements (CLA's), which they claimed the county defendants had de-
nied them. See note 2 supra; note 68 infra. The district court found that the counties had "a
financial incentive to send their retarded to Pennhurst rather than provide them with habilita-
tion within the community" since the Commonwealth paid 100% of the costs incurred in the
habilitation of an individual placed in Pennhurst, whereas each county had to pay 10% of the
costs if the individuals received services within that community. 446 F. Supp. at 1312. The
court also found that the five county defendants were not in compliance with the Common-
wealth's CLA policy that "at least 50% of the residents for these living facilities must be drawn
from institutions" such as Pennhurst. Id. at 1313. The district court further noted that,
"[a]lthough the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare, Pennhurst staff and county officials
are in complete agreement that the residents of Pennhurst should be transferred as soon as
practicable to appropriate community facilities, apparently no one has taken the initiative to
accomplish this objective." Id. (citation omitted).
4. 612 F.2d at 88. The district court found
[t]he physical environment at Pennhurst [to be] hazardous to the residents, both
physically and psychologically. There [was] often excrement and urine on the ward floors,
and the living areas (did] not meet minimal professional standards for cleanliness. Out-
breaks of pinworms and infectious disease [were] common ...
Moreover, most toilet areas [did] not have towels, soap or toilet paper, and the
bathroom facilities [were] often filthy and in a state of disrepair. Obnoxious odors and
excessive noise permeate[d] the atmosphere at Pennhurst .. . Moreover, the noise level
in the day rooms [was] often so high that many residents simply stop[ped] speaking.
Injuries to residents by other residents, and through self-abuse, [ were] com-
mon. . . . In January, 1977 alone, there were 833 minor and 25 major injuries reported.
446 F. Supp. at 1308-09 (citations and footnotes omitted). The court also found evidence that
serious injuries inflicted by staff members, including sexual assaults, had occurred. Id. at 1309.
5. 612 F.2d at 88. The district court found that "[p]hysical restraints are potentially physi-
cally harmful and can create conditions in which physical injuries are more likely to occur, and
prevent residents from learning or exercising self-care skills." 446 F. Supp. at 1307 (citations
and footnote omitted). However, the court also found that "[alt Pennhurst, restraints . . . [were]
used as control measures in lieu of adequate staffing." Id. at 1306 (footnote and citations omit-
ted). Moreover, the court determined that seclusion in solitary confinement had been used to
punish "aggressive behavior" which might not have occurred had a proper regimen of training
been available. Id.
6. 612 F.2d at 88. At trial, the court found that dangerous psychotropic drugs had been
used for behavior control and not for treatment. 446 F. Supp. at 1307. Moreover, one witness
testified "that the drug practice at Pennhurst . . . [did] not meet minimally professional stan-
dards and . . . [was] physically hazardous to the residents." Id. at 1308 (citation omitted).
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lives of idleness, causing them to regress emotionally, intellectually, and
physically. 8
The district court found that the defendants had violated the plaintiffs'
federal and state statutory rights to minimally adequate and nondiscrimina-
tory habilitation 9 as well as their federal constitutional right to such habilita-
tion under the least restrictive means possible. 10 In its decree, the court
ordered that Pennhurst must eventually be closed and directed that, in the
interim, the Commonwealth defendants must sanitize it and take steps to
prevent the recurrence of some of the more egregious abuses of the resi-
dents. 1 The court further ordered a special master to supervise the indi-
vidualized removal of the Pennhurst residents to appropriate community-
based mental retardation programs.
12
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
sitting en banc,' 3 affirmed the district court's finding that the plaintiffs'
rights had been violated 14 but modified the district court's decree in part, 15
holding that the residents of Pennhurst have a right to habilitation under
both federal 1" and state 17 statutes as well as a federal statutory right to live
8. 612 F.2d at 88-89. According to the trial court, the defendants "admitted that the in-
adequacies in programming at Pennhurst .. . [were] directly attributable to staff shortages." 446
F. Supp. at 1304. For a discussion of physical deterioration and intellectual and behavioral
regression in regard in individual cases, see id. at 1309-10.
9. 446 F. Supp. at 1322-25. The court found that the rights of the retarded at Pennhurst
under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976), and under the Pennsyl-
vania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4101-4704
(Purdon 1969), had been and were being violated. 446 F. Supp. at 1322-25. See note 2 supra.
However, the court did not reach the question of the defendants' possible liability under the
Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6081 (1976). Id.
But see notes 51-54 and accompanying text infra.
10. 446 F. Supp. at 1319. See notes 36-50 and accompanying text infra. The court also
found that the plaintiffs' constitutional right to be free from harm had been violated and that
they were being denied equal protection of the law as guaranteed by the fourteenth amend-
ment. 446 F. Supp. at 1320-22. See note 2 supra.
11. 446 F. Supp. at 1326, 1328-29. The court issued its decree after it had been informed
by the parties that they had not been able to agree among themselves on an order. See 612
F.2d at 90.
12. 446 F. Supp. at 1326-28. The court's order required the special master to prepare "[a]
plan specifying the quantity and type of community living arrangements and other community
services necessary for the habilitation of all plaintiffs in the least separate, most integrated, least
restrictive community setting." Id. at 1326-27. See also notes 92-95 and accompanying text
infra; note 98 infra. The order also enjoined the county defendants from recommending future
commitments of mentally retarded persons to Pennhurst and forbade the Commonwealth de-
fendants from placing additional persons there. 446 F. Supp. at 1327-28.
13. The Third Circuit heard arguments en banc after the panel, which had originally heard
the arguments, could not produce a single opinion which commanded majority support. 612
F.2d at 90. Judge Gibbons wrote the majority opinion. Chief Judge Seitz, joined by Judges
Aldisert and Hunter, dissented.
14. Id. at 116. The district court had entered judgment in favor of the defendants on the
plaintiffs' claim for money damages and no appeal was taken from that determination. Id. at 90
11.4.
15. Id. at 116. See note 65 infra.
16. 612 F.2d at 100.
17. Id. at 103.
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in the least restrictive environment possible.' The court remanded the
case for individual determinations by the district court or the special master
regarding those residents for whom institutionalization at an improved Penn-
hurst might be appropriate. 19 Halderman v. Pennhurst State School &
Hospital, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir, 1979) (en banc), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 1984
(1980).
The United States Supreme Court has not specifically decided whether
mentally ill or mentally retarded persons have a constitutional right to
treatment or habilitation.2 0  The overwhelming weight of legal authority,
however, indicates that, at least insofar as involuntarily confined mental pa-
tients are concerned, there exists on some basis 21 a "constitutional right to
receive such treatment as will give them a reasonable opportunity to be
cured or to improve [their] mental condition." 22
18. Id. at 107. See notes 51-54 & 60-61 and accompanying text infra; note 87 infra. See also
notes 9-10 and accompanying text supra.
19. 612 F.2d at 114.
20. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). The Donaldson Court held that a
state "'cannot constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous individual who is capable of
surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of [others]." Id. at 576. The Court found
it unnecessary to decide "the difficult issues of constitutional law ... whether mentally ill
persons dangerous to themselves or others have a right to treatment upon compulsory confine-
ment by the State, or whether the State may compulsorily confine a nondangerous, mentally ill
individual for the purpose of treatment." Id. at 573.
The petitioner in Donaldson was not retarded but was allegedly suffering from "paranoid
schizophrenia." Id. at 565. When dealing with the mentally retarded, the concern is for "habili-
tation," whereas the concern is for "treatment" when dealing with the mentally ill. See Halder-
man v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. at 1314. It is important to note that
[t]he use of the concept "habilitation" instead of "treatment" in the context of mental
retardation reflects an awareness that "mental illness" is not synonymous with "mental
retardation." Mental illness concerns an inability to cope with one's environment regard-
less of intellectual level. Mental illness can occur at any stage of life while mental retarda-
tion is considered to be a developmental disability beginning in the early years.
Mason & Menolascino, The Right to Treatment for Mentally Retarded Citizens: An Evolving
Legal and Scientific Interface, 10 CREIGHTON L. REV. 124, 147 n.72 (1976). Although the
concepts of "habilitation" and "treatment" are separate and distinct, in dealing with the question
of the right of the retarded to adequate habilitation, the district court in Pennhurst noted that
those cases which deal with the right to treatment of the mentally ill should be considered to
the extent to which they are applicable. 446 F. Supp. at 1314. One court has noted that "[i]n
the context of the right to appropriate care for people civilly confined to public mental institu-
tions, no viable distinction can be made between the mentally ill and the mentally retarded."
Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Snpp. 387, 390 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and
remanded in part sub nora. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
21. See notes 23-31 & 36-41 and accompanying text infra.
22. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Snpp. 781, 784, enforced, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala.
1971), supplemented, 344 F. Stipp. 373, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, and remanded in part sub nora. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974)
(federal constitution guarantees persons civilly committed to state mental institutions a right to
treatment which can be implemented through judicially manageable standards). See also Parham
v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (due process of law requires neutral factfinder to determine
whether statutory requirements for admission of child to state mental facility are satisfied);
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (state violates respondent's constitutional right to
liberty where it confines, without more, nondangerous respondent capable of surviving safely in
freedom by himself or with help of others); Welsch v. Likins, 550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977)
10571979-1980]
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A mentally ill person's right to treatment was first recognized in Rouse
v. Cameron.23  In finding that the petitioner, who had been involuntarily
and summarily committed, had a federal statutory "right to treatment,
'" 24
the Rouse court, through Judge Bazelon, identified four constitutional argu-
ments to support such a right. 25  The first two arguments suggest that
treatment ought to be made available in order to compensate the
petitioner-as a "quid pro quo"-for the lack of procedural due process,
26
and equal protection of the laws, 27 attendant with summary commitment.
With respect to the third argument, Judge Bazelon noted that indefinite
confinement without treatment for a person who has not been convicted of a
crime "may be so inhumane as to be 'cruel and unusual punishment' " in
violation of the eighth amendment. 28 Finally, focusing upon the fact that
the petitioner's confinement was to continue only as long as his need for
treatment persisted, Judge Bazelon reasoned that, by failing to supply the
petitioner with treatment, the hospital authorities were prolonging his con-
finement for a period which was already longer than he would have been
(mentally retarded involuntarily committed to state institutions have federal constitutional right
to treatment); Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (en bane) (mentally ill petitioner
has federal constitutional right to treatment in least restrictive environment possible); Evans v.
Washington, 459 F. Supp. 483 (D.D.C. 1978) (mentally retarded have federal constitutional
right to be free from harm); Gary W. v. Louisiana, 437 F. Supp. 1209 (E.D. La. 1976) (mentally
retarded have constitutional right to treatment),
23. 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Rouse involved a habeas corpus proceeding in which the
petitioner attacked his confinement to a mental hospital where he had been involuntarily and
summarily committed under a District of Columbia statutory provision. Id. at 452. The
petitioner had been automatically committed to the mental hospital after he had been found not
guilty of carrying a dangerous weapon by reason of insanity. Id. See generally, Birnbaum, The
Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A. J. 499 (1960).
24. 373 F.2d at 453. The court based this right to treatment upon the Hospitalization of the
Mentally Ill Act of 1964. Id. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-562 (1973).
25. 373 F.2d at 453.
26. Id. The Rouse court stated:
Lack of improvement raises a question of procedural due process where the commitment
is tinder D. C. Code section 24-301 rather than tinder the civil commitment statute, for
tinder 24-301 commitment is summary, in contrast with civil commitment safeguards. It
does not rest on any finding of present insanity and dangerousness but, on the contrary,
on a jury's reasonable doubt that the defendant was sane when he committed the act
charged. Commitment on this [summary] basis is permissible because of its humane
therapeutic goals.
Id. However, on examination of the quid pro quo theory in a subsequent case, Chief Justice
Burger could not discern a "basis for equating an involuntarily committed mental patient's un-
questioned constitutional right not to be confined without due process of law with a constitu-
tional right to treatment." O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 587-88 (1975) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring) (emphasis in original). Chief Justice Burger seemed to suggest that "strict standards
of proof or periodic redetermination of a patient's condition" in cases of civil confinement would
be sufficient to protect the patient's rights. Id. at 587 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
27. 373 F.2d at 453. judge Bazelon noted the suggestion "that a failure to supply treatment
may violate the equal protection clause." Id.
28. Id. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII1. The United States Supreme Court has held that the
fourteenth amendment makes the eighth amendment applicable to the states, and that punish-
ment for nonviolent status offenses is a violation of the eighth amendment, thus expressly man-
dating civil commitment and treatment, rather than criminal confinement, for such offenses. See
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (narcotics addict entitled to treatment).
1058
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confined had he been convicted and served a prison sentence, thereby de-
priving him of substantive due process.
29
Federal courts have drawn on the substantive due process argument in
holding that involuntary confinement must be justified by a legitimate state
purpose. 3 0  Accordingly, if the purported purpose of confinement is the
need for treatment or, by analogy, habilitation, then the state has an obliga-
tion to treat or habilitate confined persons.
3'
The need for treatment, however, has not been the sole ground for civil
commitment: historically, danger to oneself and danger to others have also
served to justify commitment. 32 Given the notion that the nature of the
29. 373 F.2d at 453.
30. See, e.g., Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated on other
grounds and remanded, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (civil commitment involves deprivation of liberty
which must be justified in terms of permissible governmental goal in order to comport with
substantive due process); Gary W. v. Louisiana, 437 F. Stipp. 1209 (E.D. La. 1976) (involuntary
institutional confinement is a massive deprivation of liberty which must be justified by permis-
sible governmental interest). See also note 31 and accompanying text infra.
In his seminal work on the subject, Dr. Morton Birnbaum proposed
that the courts under their traditional powers to protect the constitutional rights of our
citizens begin to consider the problem of whether or not a person who has been in-
stitutionalized solely because he is sufficiently mentally ill to require institutionalization
for care and treatment actually does receive adequate medical treatment so that he may
regain his health, and therefore his liberty, as soon as possible, that the courts do this by
means of recognizing and enforcing the right to treatment, and that the courts do this
independent of any action by any legislature, as a necessary and overdue development of
our present concept of due process of law.
Birnbaum, supra note 23, at 503.
31. See Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (treatment and habilitation);
Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated on other grounds and remanded
sub nom. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (treatment); Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d
352 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974) (treatment), Gary W. v. Louisiana, 437 F.
Supp. 1209 (E.D. La. 1976) (habilitation); Woe v. Matthews, 408 F. Supp. 419 (E.D.N.Y.
1976), remanded in part and dismissed in part sub nom. Woe v. Weinberger, 556 F.2d 563 (2d
Cir. 1977) (treatment); Davis v. Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Ohio 1974) (treatment);
Saville v. Treadway, 404 F. Supp. 430 (M.D. Tenn. 1974) (habilitation); Welsch v. Likins, 373
F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974), aff'd in part, vacated in part, and remanded in part, 550 F.2d
1122 (8th Cir. 1977) (habilitation). But see Burnham v. Department of Pub. Health, 349 F.
Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ga. 1972), rev'd, 503 F.2d 1319 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1057
(1975).
See also Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 391 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, and remanded in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). Wyatt
was the first case to apply the right to treatment rationale to the mentally retarded. Having
determined in its earlier consideration of the case that persons involuntarily committed to men-
tal institutions have a right to treatment, the Wyatt court felt compelled to extend an analogous
right to the mentally retarded. 344 F. Supp. at 390. See Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781,
enforced, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), supplemented, 344 F. Supp. 373, 344 F. Supp.
387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded in part sub norn. Wyatt v.
Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). Since 1972, a number of courts have followed Wyatt
and have held that mentally retarded persons confined in state-run institutions have a constitu-
tional right to habilitation. See, e.g., Gary W. v. Louisiana, 437 F. Supp. 1209 (E.D. La. 1976);
Saville v. Treadway, 404 F. Supp. 430 (M.D. Tenn. 1974); Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487
(D. Minn. 1974), aff'd in part, vacated in part, and remanded in part, 550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir.
1977). In each of these cases, the court either concluded or assumed that the state could pro-
vide the necessary habilitation in an institutional setting. See, e.g., Gary W. v. Louisiana, 437
F. Supp. at 1217-19.
32. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 737 (1972) (criminal defendant, confined under more
lenient commitment standard and subject to more stringent standard of release than generally
applicable, deprived of equal protection).
10591979-1980]
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confinement of mental patients ought to bear some reasonable relationship to
its purpose, 33 the substantive due process argument has been criticized as
being an improper rationale for the rights to treatment and habilitation 34
since it cannot accommodate an indefinite confinement which is justified by
these two latter, purely protective, grounds for commitment.3 5
The least restrictive alternative theory supports "a right to superior, in-
dividual treatment for virtually all committees." 3 6 This theory was first ex-
pressed, again by Judge Bazelon, in Lake v. Cameron,3 7 in which a sixty-
year-old woman had been institutionalized after being deemed unable to
care for herself.38 In appealing her commitment, the petitioner did not
contest the legality of the decision to impose treatment; rather, she argued
that more appropriate treatment was available in a setting which was less
restrictive than the "confinement" of the mental hospital. 39 Remanding the
case for consideration of alternative courses of treatment,40 Judge Bazelon
33. See id. at 738. See also note 35 inf11ra.
34. See Spece, Preserving The Right to Treatment: A Critical Assessment and Constructive
Development of Constitutional Right to Treatment Theories, 20 ARIz. L. REV. 1, 12-15 (1978).
Although each of the constitutional arguments for a right to treatment or habilitation have, in
one form or another, been successfully employed, there is some dispute as to whether these
theories really present a logical and precedentially sound basis for the right, Id. For those cases
in which a constitutional right to treatment or habilitation has been recognized, see note 31
supra.
35. See Spece, supra note 34, at 15. At least one court, in a jurisdiction which recognizes a
right to treatment, has avoided the problem of having to justify the deprivation of clue process
which results from purely protective confinement by reasoning that treatment is the only valid
purpose for which a person may be confined. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784-85,
enforced, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), supplemented, 344 F. Supp. 373, 344 F. Supp.
387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded in part sub nom. Wyatt v.
Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
36. Spece, supra note 34, at 47. See also, Hoffman & Foust, Least Restrictive Treatment of
the Mentally Ill: A Doctrine in Search of Its Senses, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1100 (1977).
37. 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (en banc).
38. Id. at 658. The petitioner in Lake suffered from a chronic brain syndrome. Id.
39. Id. at 659.
40. Id. at 661. Judicial inquiry into such alternatives has prompted considerable debate as to
whether the courts are "equipped to carry out the broad ... inquiry proposed or to resolve the
social and economic issues involved." Id. at 663 (Burger, J., dissenting). Accord, Department of
Health & Rehab. Serv. v. Owens, 305 So. 2d 314 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974). See also State v.
Sanchez, 80 N.M. 438, 457 P.2d 370 (1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 276 (1970) (quoting
dissent in Lake). Similarly, a district court has suggested that the judiciary is not sufficiently
knowledgeable to choose a less restrictive alternative from among various treatment options and
that, therefore, the decision should be left to the professional judgment of clinicians. J.R. v.
Parham, 412 F. Supp. 112, 139 (M.D. Ga. 1976), rev'd and remanded on other grounds,
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979). Moreover, it is also questionable whether the courts are
able to strike a proper balance between the clinical expertise and therapeutic interests on the
one hand, and judicial expertise and individual liberties on the other. Compare United States v.
Ecker, 543 F.2d 178 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063 (1977) (court conducted de
novo review in light of expert testimony) with Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn.
1974), aff'd in part, vacated in part, and remanded in part, 550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977) (state
need only make good faith attempt to place person in appropriate setting).
Having struck such a balance and having found that a less restrictive environment is ap-
propriate for a mental patient, courts are frequently thwarted in the enforcement of their orders
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held that "[d]eprivations of liberty solely because of dangers to ill persons
themselves should not go beyond what is necessary for their protection."41
A number of states have enacted statutes which provide a right to
treatment for the residents of their state mental institutions. 4 2  In Pennsyl-
vania, the Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966 (MH/MR
Act)43 established that the Department of Public Welfare must "assure
within the State the availability and equitable provision of adequate mental
health and mental retardation services for all people who need them." 44
The MH/MR Act provides for a division of responsibility between the Com-
monwealth and the counties for the care of the state's mentally retarded.4 5
Those few courts which have considered the MH/MR Act have gleaned from
it a right to treatment for the mentally handicapped.
46
The United States Congress has also recognized the need of mentally
handicapped citizens for protection and has enacted the Developmentally
Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act (DDA/BR Act). 4 7  This legislation
establishes that "[plersons with developmental disabilities have a right to
appropriate treatment, services, and habilitation for such disabilities."
' 48
for the patient's treatment by a lack of available alternative facilities. See Lake v. Cameron, 267
F. Supp. 155, 158-59 (D.D.C. 1967) (on remand). But cf. Dixon v. Weinberger, 405 F. Supp.
974, 980 (D.D.C. 1975) (federal government and District of Columbia have joint duty to de-
velop alternative facilities). To overcome this obstacle, courts have often had to embroil them-
selves in the arduous task of administering the creation of alternatives. See, e.g., J.R. v.
Parham, 412 F. Supp. at 139; Dixon v. Weinberger, 405 F. Supp. at 980; Morales V. Turman,
383 F. Supp. 53, 125-26 (E.D. Tex. 1974).
41. 364 F.2d at 660.
42. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 394.459 (1)-(2), (4 )(a) (West 1978); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
30:6D-9 (West 1979); WIsc. STAT. ANN. §§ 51.61 (e)-(f) (West 1979). For a discussion of the
relevant Pennsylvania statute, see notes 43-46 and accompanying text infra.
43. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4101-4704 (Purdon 1969).
44. Id. § 4201(2). A state's involvement in the fields of mental health and mental retardation
is based upon its sovereign duty to provide for the general health and welfare of its citizens, and
its chosen method of discharging this responsibility is generally respected in the absence of a
'clear collision" with a federal constitutional or statutory mandate. See Kesler v. Department of
Pub. Safety, 369 U.S. 153 (1962); Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837);
Parker v. Children's Hosp., 483 Pa. 106, 394 A.2d 932 (1978), overruled in part on other
grounds sub nom. Mattos v. Thompson, - Pa. - , 421 A.2d 190 (1980). See also notes 80-82
and accompanying text infra.
45. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4102, 4202(a), 4301(d), 4507(a)(1). The Commonwealth is
responsible for large residential institutions, such as Pennhurst, while the counties operate
smaller and less isolated programs, referred to as Community Living Arrangements. Id. See
note 68 infra.
46. See Eubanks v. Clarke, 434 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (involuntarily committed
schizophrenic has state right to treatment); Hoolick v. Retreat State Hosp., 24 Pa. Commw. Ct.
218, 354 A.2d 609 (1976), aff'd, 476 Pa. 317, 382 A.2d 739 (1978) (MH/MR Act described as
comprehensive program for care, treatment, and rehabilitation of mentally retarded persons); In
re Joyce Z., 123 PiTT. L.J. 181 (1975) (mentally retarded child had right to treatment).
47. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6081 (1976).
48. Id. § 6010(1). The so-called "'Bill of Rights" section provides:
Congress makes the following findings respecting the rights of persons with develop-
mental disabilities:
(1) Persons with developmental disabilities have a right to appropriate treatment,
services, and habilitation for such disabilities.
1979-1980] 1061
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Both the federal government and the states are obligated to ensure that only
those institutions which "provide treatment, services, and habilitation which
is appropriate to the needs" of the mentally retarded receive public funds.49
The DDA/BR Act further requires that those publicly financed habilitation
programs "be provided in the setting that is least restrictive of the person's
personal liberty." 
5 0
(2) The treatment, services, and habilitation for a person with developmental dis-
abilities should be designed to maximize the developmental potential of the person and
should be provided in the setting that is least restrictive of the person's personal liberty.
(3) The Federal Government and the States both have an obligation to assure that
public funds are not provided to any institution or other residential program for persons
with developmental disabilities that-
(A) does not provide treatment, services, and habilitation which is appropriate to
the needs of such persons; or
(B) does not meet the following minimum standards:
(i) Provision of a nourishing, well-balanced daily diet to the persons with
developmental disabilities being served by the program.
(ii) Provision to such persons of appropriate and sufficient medical and den-
tal services.
(iii) Prohibition of the use of physical restraint on such persons unless abso-
lutely necessary and prohibition of the use of such restraint as a punishment or as a
substitute for a habilitation program.
(iv) Prohibition on the excessive use of chemical restraints on such persons
and the use of such restraints as punishment or as a substitute for a habilitation program
or in quantities that interfere with services, treatment, or habilitation for such persons.
(v) Permission for close relatives of such persons to visit them at reasonable
hours without prior notice.
(vi) Compliance with adequate fire and safety standards as may be promul-
gated by the Secretary.
(4) All programs for persons with developmental disabilities should meet standards
which are designed to assure the most favorable possible outcome for those served, and-
(A) in the case of residential programs serving persons in need of comprehensive
health-related, habilitative, or rehabilitative services, which are at least equivalent to
those standards applicable to intermediate care facilities for the mentally retarded pro-
mulgated in regulations of the Secretary on January 17, 1974 (39 Fed. Reg. pt. II), as
appropriate when taking into account the size of the institutions and the service delivery
arrangements of the facilities of the programs;
(B) in the case of other residential programs for persons with developmental
disabilities, which assure that care is appropriate to the needs of the persons being served
by such programs, assure that the persons admitted to facilities of such programs are
persons whose needs can be met through services provided by such facilities, and assure
that the facilities under such programs provide for the humane care of the residents of the
facilities, are sanitary, and protect their rights; and
(C) in the case of nonresidential programs, which assure the care provided by
such programs is appropriate to the persons being served by the programs.
Id. § 6010.
49. Id. § 6010(3)(A). See note 48 supra.
50. Id. § 6010(2). See note 48 supra. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 is, like
section 6010 of the DDA/BR Act, a civil rights act for the handicapped providing that
[n]o otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, . . . shall,
solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance.
29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976).
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Having noted the preference of the federal courts to resolve claims on
statutory grounds before adjudicating constitutional issues, 5 1 the Pennhurst
court found, in light of the legislative history, 52 that the express language of
the DDA/BR Act-5 was intended to provide the mentally retarded residents
of Pennhurst with a privately enforceable federal statutory right to habilita-
tion. 
5 4
The Pennhurst court found that the MH/MR Act also grants plaintiffs a
privately enforceable state statutory right to habilitation.5 5 In so finding,
the majority rejected the Commonwealth's assertion that, because the state
Act predicates services to the mentally retarded on the availability of funds,
the MH/MR Act never contemplated granting an unconditional right to
habilitation. 56 The court stated that the Commonwealth must provide
adequate habilitative services to the mentally retarded "to the extent" that it
maintains facilities for the mentally handicapped. 57  Rejecting the county
defendants' contention that their responsibilities toward the mentally re-
tarded are limited to those specifically enumerated in the Act, " , the court
pointed out that the MH/MR Act contemplates "a joint venture" between
the Commonwealth and the counties to provide care for the state's mentally
retarded. 59
Having concluded that the Pennhurst residents have a right to treat-
me.nt, the majority, in examining the DDA/BR Act, detected "a clear con-
gressional preference for deinstitutionalization." 60 The majority concluded,
51. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d at 94. Moreover, the court
noted that the preferred order is to interpret federal statutory issues first and then to consider
state statutory grounds. Id .
52. Id. at 96-97. The court noted that the conference report for the DDA/BR Act stated that
"the developmentally disabled have a right to appropriate treatment, services and habilitation."
Id. at 96.
53. See notes 48-50 and accompanying text supra.
54. 612 F.2d at 100. Only one other court has considered whether private litigants may
enforce the rights granted under the federal Act. See Naughton v. Bevilacqua, 458 F. Supp. 610
(D.R.I. 1978), aff'd, 605 F.2d 586 (1st Cir. 1979) (mentally retarded schizophrenic has private
right of action).
55. 612 F.2d at 103. Accord, Eubanks v. Clarke, 434 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (in-
voluntarily committed schizophrenic has a right to treatment or release). in making its determi-
nation, the Third Circuit relied upon both the language and legislative history of the state Act.
612 F.2d at 100-01.
56. 612 F.2d at 102.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 103. The county defendants also argued that any duty to provide treatment rested
solely upon the Commonwealth. Id.
59. Id. at 102. The majority found that, although the MH/MR Act specified certain facilities
for which the counties would be principally responsible, the Act as a whole contemplates par-
ticipation by the counties "in all facets of the state's provision of services." Id. at 103.
Moreover, in practice, since the counties had been responsible for arranging the admission of
persons to Pennhurst through their local service operations, "the Counties have joined inextric-
ably in the state's provision-or lack of provision-of treatment .. . [and] cannot at this late
date escape" responsibility. Id.
60. Id. at 104. The plaintiffs contended that the Commonwealth was obligated to provide
habilitation in an environment which infringed least on the personal liberties of the mentally
retarded. Id. at 103-04. The majority stated that its affirmance of the plaintiffs' principal claim to
a right to habilitation on statutory grounds obviated the need for a consideration of the constitu-
tional merits of the issue. Id. at 104.
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therefore, that the federal Act established a right of the mentally retarded to
be habilitated in the least restrictive environment possible.
61
The Third Circuit noted, however, that while the intent of Congress
may have been in favor of the "establishment of community programs as
alternatives to institutionalization"-6 2 in an effort to eliminate the "inappro-
priate placement" of the mentally handicapped in institutions,6 3 the DDA/BR
Act does not prohibit all institutions. 64 For some "comparatively rare" indi-
vidual cases, the majority recognized that "adequate habilitation could not
be accomplished in any setting less restrictive than an institution." 6 5  Em-
phasizing "the discrete needs of individual patients,"-66 the Third Circuit
61. Id. at 107. The court cited the Act itself and its legislative history at great length. Id. at
104-06. See notes 53-54 and accompanying text supra. But cf. notes 69-77 and accompanying
text infra. The Commonwealth defendants, however, argued that, "because the Act, until 1978,
required states to spend a specific minimum amount for deinstitutionalization, the states were
free to use institutions as much as they chose so long as they spent the specified amounts on
alternative facilities." 612 F.2d at 107. In rejecting this argument, the majority stated that the
minimum expenditure requirement "was clearly intended to encourage the development of al-
ternative facilities ... [and] must not be confused with a maximum duty on the States' part; to
do so would substantially undermine the rights articulated .. . and the insistence on specific
deinstitutionalization plans." Id.
Having satisfied itself that the plaintiffs had an enforceable statutory claim under the
DDA/BR Act, the majority declined to consider whether § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
provided an alternative basis for enforcing the right to treatment or habilitation in the least
restrictive environment. Id. at 107-08. For the text of § 504, see note 50 supra.
62. 42 U.S.C. § 6063(b)(23) (1976).
63. See id. § 6063(b)(20).
64. 612 F.2d at 106-07.
65. Id. at 107. While the Third Circuit agreed with the district court's finding that "for the
retarded class members as a whole, Pennhurst cannot be an appropriate setting in which to
provide habilitation," the majority disagreed with the lower court's determination that "Penn-
hurst could never provide adequate habilitation because of its very status as a large institu-
tion." Id. at 113-14 (emphasis in original). Moreover, the Third Circuit noted that "for some
patients, institutionalization might be 'appropriate.' In those individual cases .... the need for
... [adequate] habilitation could thereby justify institutionalization." Id. at 107. For these
reasons, the Third Circuit disagreed with the order of the district court that Pennhurst be
closed completely. Id. at 113.
Nevertheless, the court stated emphatically that this disagreement in no way intimated any
disapproval of the interim measures ordered by the district court for the improvement of Penn-
burst:
Quite the reverse: state and federal laws plainly require that if Pennhurst is to re-
main open for at least some patients, it must be dramatically improved so as to provide
adequate habilitation. Neither should our willingness to permit retention of Pennhurst as
an institution available for those who cannot be treated in any less restrictive environment
be construed as an invitation to the appellants to desist from opening up alternative com-
munity facilities. As we have said, institutionalization is a disfavored approach to habilita-
tion. Only where the court or the Master finds that an improved Pennhurst is the only
appropriate place for individual patients should it be used. For all other patients, [Com-
munity Living Arrangements] must be provided.
Id. at 116 (footnote omitted). See note 68 and accompanying text infra.
The Third Circuit's premise that institutions can be justified if "needed" echoes the con-
stitutional substantive due process rationale that confinement based upon the "need" for treat-
ment or habilitation creates an obligation on the part of the state to treat or habilitate. See notes
30-31 and accompanying text supra.
66. 612 F.2d at 114. The court observed that some patients might find a transfer from
Pennhurst to a community "too unsettling" and that some patients might lack the "minimum
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directed the trial court to employ a case-by-case analysis in determining "the
appropriateness of an improved Pennhurst." 67  For those for whom Penn-
hurst is deemed "inappropriate," the court ordered the Commonwealth to
provide accommodations in the county-operated Community Living Arrange-
ments (CLA's).6 8
Chief Judge Seitz, writing for the dissent, assumed for purposes of his
argument that the Pennhurst patients possess a statutory right to "treat-
ment" under both the DDA/BR Act and the MH/MR Act. 69 Although such
a right requires that the substandard conditions at Pennhurst be corrected, 70
it does not, according to the dissent, compel treatment in the least restric-
tive environment possible. 71  Neither the statutory language 72 nor a con-
67. Id. In order to facilitate its determination of the "appropriate" setting for each patient's
habilitation, the district court may, according to the Third Circuit, "permit particular organiza-
tions to intervene at the relief stage or create subclasses." Id. at 116. The court emphasized,
however, that "[n]o matter how it is accomplished, ... an assessment of each class member's
needs must be carried out." Id. (emphasis added).
68. Id. at 116. See note 45 supra; note 90 infra. In evaluating each patient's needs, the
district court or special master was directed to begin with the rebuttable "presumption that
individuals should be placed in CLAs." 612 F.2d at 115. The majority cautioned, however, that,
before ordering the transfer of patients to CLA's, both the district court and the master
must have assurances that the sanitary, staffings, and program deficiencies which were
found at Pennhurst are not duplicated on a smaller scale in the CLAs. If staffing and
programs are inadequate at the CLAs, then the goals of deinstitutionalization will not be
met. Mere changes in the size of buildings and their location are not enough to meet the
statutory requirements.
Id. at 116.
Established in the home counties of the Pennhurst residents, CLA's are operated by local
private companies which contract with the county and are financed by the Commonwealth.
Philadelphia Inquirer, Sept. 14, 1980, § M, at 4, col. 4-5. It has been noted that
[t]he companies provide homes, programs and staff to care for the residents and teach
them to dress themselves, do their laundry and help with the cooking or grocery shop-
ping, depending on their level of retardation.
The state also requires that everyone in a CLA go out on weekdays for some learning
activity-public school for people under 21, some sort of workshop, ranging from pre-
vocational to toilet training, for the adults.
Additional services-doctors, psychologists, speech therapists and the like-are pro-
vided on a consulting basis. Each county is supposed to have a team of special education
experts and psychologists on call for crises.
Id., col. 5.
69. 612 F.2d at 117, 122 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting). Chief judge Seitz explicitly rejected the
plaintiffs' claim under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, however, stating that the "care-
fully tailored system of programs and grants in the legislation as a whole belies any congres-
sional intention to impose an absolute duty to provide the least restrictive treatment." Id. at
120-21 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting). The majority had simply declined to consider the plaintiffs'
section 504 claim. See note 61 supra. For the relevant text of § 504, see note 50 supra.
70. 612 F.2d at 117 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 122 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting).
72. See id. at 118-19, 122 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting). Concerning the federal DDA/BR Act,
Chief Judge Seitz maintained that Congress had merely intended the Act and the concomitant
federal funds as an incentive for the states to deinstitutionalize their programs for the mentally
handicapped. Id. at 118-19 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting). According to the dissent,
[tihe Act nowhere places such a duty of least restrictive treatment on those states accept-
ing federal funding. The Act is extremely explicit as to the duties of those states that
1979-1980] 1065
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stitutional analysis, 73 argued Chief Judge Seitz, imposes a duty upon the
states to habilitate by some "less drastic means" than institutionalization.
74
The dissent maintained that the state's purpose in responding to the
mentally retardeds' need for care and supervision supported institutional
confinement 75 and that any attendant restraints on the residents' personal
liberties need only be rationally related to the purpose of the confine-
ment. 76  Chief Judge Seitz criticized the constitutional "less drastic means"
analysis as being unworkable-a single, better alternative to institutionaliza-
tion being too difficult to ascertain in light of the need for individual and
continual medical evaluation of the patients' needs.
77
The portion of the Pennhurst court's holding which found that the plain-
tiffs have a right to habilitation is consistent with prior interpretations of the
DDA/BR Act 78 and the trend of constitutionally-based decisions in this
area. 79 The court's instruction that habilitation be provided in the least re-
strictive setting possible, however, appears to confict with well-settled prin-
receive such funds. The heart of the states' duty under the Act is section 6063 .... Prior
to the 1978 amendments, section 6063 (b)(20) required that ... [before a state can re-
ceive federal funds, it must submit to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW)]
a plan designed (A) to eliminate inappropriate placement in institutions of per-
sons with developmental disabilities, and (B) to improve the quality of care and the
state of surroundings of persons for whom institutional care is appropriate.
Moreover, the state must maintain individual habilitation plans and an advocacy system to
ensure that the general plan approved by HEW is properly implemented.
Id. at 118, quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6063(b) (20) (Seitz, C.J., dissenting) (footnote and citation
omitted).
Similarly, the dissent remarked that, whereas Pennsylvania's MH/MR Act "sets out the
duties of the state . . ., nowhere does it mention a duty to provide the least restrictive treat-
ment regardless of fiscal concerns." Id. at 122 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting).
73. See id. at 123-30 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting).
74. See id. at 126-29 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting). See also notes 75-77 and accompanying text
infra.
75. 612 F.2d at 126 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting). Having noted the findings of the district court,
the dissent stated that the
defendants are doing fiar more than relieving otherwise willing and able relatives of the
burden of caring for the residents; they are acting as the residents' only source of
food, shelter, supervision, and medical care. Far from being "trivial," these services are a
matter of life or death to the residents.
Id. at 125-26 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
76. Id. at 129 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 128-29 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting). The dissent considered the majority's ruling to
have gone
far beyond the proposition that federal courts should require the state to eliminate
the deplorable conditions at Pennhurst. The effect of the rule is to require the state to
create new facilities regardless of the feasibility or practicality of such a course of action.
Moreover, because persons develop over time, the federal courts will become embroiled
in almost continual supervision to ensure that each individual at any particular moment is
in the least restrictive environment.
Id. at 117 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting). Chief Judge Seitz concluded that institutionalization at Penn-
hurst was not in itself a "constitutionally unreasonable means" of providing for the care and
supervision of the mentally retarded and that a properly run Pennhurst would not unreasonably
restrict its residents' personal liberty. Id. at 129 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting).
78. See notes 52-54 and accompanying text supra.
79. See notes 21-22 and accompanying text supra.
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ciples of state sovereignty.8 0 It is submitted that the state's police power to
provide for the general health and welfare of its citizens must be considered
and accommodated in any analysis of the manner in which state-sponsored
habilitative services should be rendered to the mentally retarded," and, ab-
sent some "collision" with federal law, the state law must be respected.
8 2
In an exercise of its police power, the Pennsylvania legislature enacted
the MH/MR Act in which it utilizes institutionalization as a major compo-
nent of the state's comprehensive habilitative program.8 3 Although the
Pennhurst majority may have correctly found that the congressional intent
behind the DDA/BR Act was deinstitutionalization and that the federal Act
required those states which accepted federal funds "to support the estab-
lishment of community programs as alternatives to institutionalization,"' 8 4 it
seems clear that the federal DDA/BR Act imposes no mandate with which
the MH/MR Act "collides. '5 Therefore, unless the court were to find a
federal constitutional right with which the state Act conflicts,8 6 it is submit-
ted that the Commonwealth's policy regarding the care of its mentally re-
tarded citizens -formulated as part of its sovereign duty-should be re-
spected.
8 7
80. The United States Supreme Court has long held that among a state's sovereign duties is
the duty to provide for the general welfare of its citizens. See Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36
U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 138 (1837). The Court has further stated that this police power, "especially
when exerted for the protection of life and limb, . . .should be respected unless there is a clear
collision with a national law which has the right of way under the Supremacy Clause of Article
VI." Kesler v. Department of Pub. Safety, 369 U.S. 153, 172 (1962).
81. The state's sovereign duty to provide for its citizens' general welfare includes the author-
ity to enact legislation "which it may deem to be conducive to these ends ...where the power
over the particular subject, or the manner of its exercise is not surrendered or restrained" by
the Federal Constitution. Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 138 (1837) (em-
phasis added).
82. Parker v. Children's Hosp., 483 Pa. 106, 116, 394 A.2d 932, 937 (1978), overruled in
part on other grounds sub noma. Mattos v. Thompson, - Pa. -, 421 A.2d 190 (1980). The
Parker Court noted:
[Ilt must be remembered that a legislative enactment enjoys a presumption in favor
of its constitutionality and will not be declared unconstitutional unless it clearly, palpably
and plainly violates the Constitution. All doubts are to be resolved in favor of a finding of
constitutionality. . . .The legislature must be respected in its attempt to exercise the
State's police power and the power of judicial review must not be used as a means by
which the courts might substitute its [sic] judgement as to public policy for that of the
legislature.
Id. (citations omitted).
83. See notes 43-46 and accompanying text supra.
84. 42 U.S.C. § 6063 (b)(23) (1976) (emphasis added). See notes 60-64 and accompanying
text supra.
85. 612 F.2d at 119 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting). See note 82 and accompanying text supra.
86. The Pennhurst majority specifically declined to consider the constitutional merits of the
plaintiffs' claim, having satisfied itself that the statutory basis was sufficient. See note 60 supra.
87. It should be noted that the Pennhurst court did not inquire into or base its least-
restrictive standard upon the state statute. See 612 F.2d at 103-08. Without a specific analysis
and construction of the MH/MR Act, the Pennsylvania legislature's intent can only be inferred
from the Commonwealth's practices in implementing the statute. Neither the Pennhurst court's
analysis nor such state implementation of the statute, it is submitted, suggest that the mentally
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It is ftirther submitted that, in striking an improper balance between
clinical and judicial expertise,8 8 the Pennhurst court has achieved that which
it cautioned against: duplicating the deficiencies of Pennhurst on a smaller
scale in the CLA's.8 9 In executing his mandate to resettle in CLA's those
88. For a brief critical discussion of the appropriateness of judicially mandated medical
treatment, see note 40 supra. Accord, 612 F.2d at 128 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting). For the dissent's
view on this point, see note 77 and accompanying text supra.
89. See note 68 supra; notes 90-91 & 94 and accompanying text infra. On October 11, 1980,
this author interviewed a Provider of Services for a Base Service Unit (BSU) within Philadelphia
County who prefers to remain anonymous at this time [hereinafter cited as Provider Interview].
This Provider, who administers the operation of a CLA, suspects that drugs continue to be used
as a means toward behavioral control in some CLA's. Provider Interview. Although when he
became a Provider in July, 1979, the Philadelphia County Provider's Manual discouraged the
use of medication for behavioral control, this Provider correctly suspected that his new clients
were nevertheless taking medication for that purpose and unilaterally directed that they be
reevaluated by the consulting psychiatrist in order to determine the necessity of the medication.
Id. Moreover, although only one of the five residents in his CLA is a member of the Pennhurst
plaintiff class, this Provider has never received a directive from either the special master or the
Philadelphia County mental health/mental retardation administrators notifying him of their
compliance with that portion of the district court's original order, with regard to the plaintiff
class, enjoining the Commonwealth defendants from:
(a) Administering excessive or unnecessary medications to class members;
(b) Using medication as punishment, for the convenience of the staff, as a substitute
for programming, or in quantities that interfere with a Pennhurst resident's functioning;
(c) Failing to ensure that only appropriately trained staff are allowed to administer
drugs to residents;
(d) Failing to provide training programs to staff who administer drugs to residents.
The nature of such training programs, and the qualifications to be required of staff mem-
bers who administer drugs to residents shall be established in the plan;
(e) Administering drugs to residents on [an "as needed"] basis. Written policies and
procedures governing the safe administration and handling of medications shall be estab-
lished pursuant to guidelines developed in the plan;
(f) Failing to monitor and to provide for at least monthly reviews by a physician of
each resident's medications.
Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. at 1329. See notes 91-92 & 94 and
accompanying text infra. Moreover, this Provider noted that there have been cases in which
either he or a member of his staff has requested of the consulting psychiatrist that a client be
prescribed specific medication for legitimate reasons, but, except for those relating to members
of the Pennhurst plaintiff class, these requests are routinely granted without the psychiatrist
ever having seen the client. Provider Interview, supra. See also note 94 infra. It is also
noteworthy that only members of the plaintiff class have their medication closely monitored by
periodic blood tests. Id. See note 94 and accompanying text infra.
As a result of insufficient funding, the county cannot offer competitive salaries to attract the
high-quality personnel needed to administer CLA's and daytime habilitation programs. Provider
Interview, supra. In one daytime program, for example, the entire staff, except for the director,
resigned and the program was then administered by the patients themselves. Id. Nor can the
county finance adequate habilitation programs which are required in order to "help the client to
achieve his or her individual potential by making available to him or her the opportunities
which are available to the normal person-such as vocational habilitation (job-training for the
high-fuictioning clients) so that they can become productive members of society." Id.
Similarly, at the CLA, budgetary constraints prohibit the hiring of the most qualified staff:
"The 'A' people just get lip and leave and we're stuck with the 'C' people." Id. As a result, an
already overworked staff must train new staff members, a task which diverts their attention from
patient-related matters. See note 90 infra. Moreover, staff shortages result in the inadequacy of
such community services as dental care (because of the time required to transport patients long
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plaintiff-patients for whom an improved Pennhurst was "inappropriate," the
special master has apparently failed to canvass adequately "the discrete
needs of individual patients." 90  Moreover, due to inadequate funding, the
members of the plaintiff class, although benefiting from the unstructured
environment of the CLA's, are deprived of the full range of habilitative
programs and services which should otherwise be available to them in accord-
ance with the Pennhurst majority's interpretation of their federal and state
statutory rights. 9 '
The ramifications of the Pennhurst decision are broad and incisive.
Fundamentally, the court held that mentally handicapped persons- i.e.,
the mentally ill, as well as the mentally retarded, who do not require in-
stitutionalization for adequate treatment/habilitation-have a federal statu-
tory right to treatment/habilitation in the least restrictive environment possi-
ble. 92  For the mentally handicapped, this means a mandatory transfer to
community habilitation programs. 93 Nevertheless, since county adminis-
trators of local mental retardation programs now give such preferential
treatment as periodic reevaluation of individual habilitative programs (IHP's)
to members of the Pennhurst plaintiff class, thereby reducing the resources
available to non-class members, not all of the community's mentally retarded
will share in the benefits.of the Third Circuit's decision.
9 4
90. See 612 F.2d at 114 (emphasis in original). In criticizing the district court's "wholesale
judgment" that, for the retarded class members as a whole, Pennhurst could not be an appro-
priate setting in which to provide habilitation, the Pennhurst court stated that
the trial court did not adequately canvass the discrete needs of individual patients. For
some patients a transfer from Pennhurst might be too unsettling a move. Longterm pa-
tients, for example, may have suffered such degeneration in the minimum skills needed
for community living that habilitation outside an institution is a practical impossibility.
Id. See notes 65-68 and accompanying text supra. The court further stated that "[oinly where
the court or the Master finds that an improved Pennhurst is the only appropriate place for
individual patients should it be used. For all other patients, CLAs must be provided." 612 F.2d
at 116 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). See notes 62-68 and accompanying text supra.
Despite the Third Circuit's directive, in at least one case, a patient with severe behavioral
problems, who requires a restrictive environment, was transferred from Pennhurst to a CLA.
Provider Interview, supra note 89. Although a procedure is established whereby a former
Pennhurst patient may, in theory, be readmitted to Pennhurst, such readmission is, in practice,
a virtual impossibility in light of the court's order and the fact that inadequate staffing prohibits
the taking of the time required to gather the necessary documentation to prove a case for
readmission. Id. As a consequence, Philadelphia County has agreed to secure an apartment for
the patient in order to provide her with a more restrictive setting, and to hire two full-time and
one part-time staff members to care for her. Id. This expenditure of scarce financial resources
should, it is submitted, be compared to the situation of an individual CLA housing five patients,
in which there are two full-time and three part-time staff members. Id. See text accompanying
note 91 infra.
91. See notes 89 & 90 supra.
92. 612 F.2d at 107. See note 61 and accompanying text supra.
93. See note 68 and accompanying text supra; note 90 supra.
94. Although, in addition to Pennhurst, there are two other institutions-Woodhaven
Center and Embreeville Center-for the mentally retarded in southeastern Pennsylvania, the
residents being transferred from the latter two institutions to CLA's are not within the plaintiff
class and, therefore, are not protected by the order of the district court. Similarly, former
residents of Pennhurst who had been transferred to CLA's before plaintiff Halderman com-
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Moreover, the shifting of emphasis to CLA's and away from in-
stitutionalization will mean the partial, if not total, closing of residential
menced her class action are also not protected. For a discussion of the makeup of the plaintiff
class, see note 2 supra. In its order, the district court required the special master to prepare all
of the following:
A report specifying resources, procedures, and a schedule for individual evaluations and
the formulation of individual exit and community program plans required for the habilita-
tion of each member of plaintiff class and for their periodic rieview.
* . . A plan for the recruitement, hiring and training of a sufficient number of qualified
community staff to be detailed to each Base Service Unit to manage the preparation of
individual exit and community program plans for each member of plaintiff class and upon
completion of such plans to assist in the execution of the responsibility to create, develop,
maintain, and monitor the community living arrangements and other services required.
* . . A plan for the creation, development and maintenance of mechanisms to monitor a
system of community services to assure that community living arrangements and other
community services of the necessary quality and quantity are continously provided to
retarded persons in the least separate, most integrated, least restrictive community set-
ting, which plan shall include but shall not be limited to the provision of friend-advocates
to assist in the protection of the rights of each member of plaintiff class.
* . . A plan to provide retarded people, members of the class, with continuing information
concerning the effect and the implementation of the Court's decision, concerning the
plans to provide all necessary community living arrangements and other community serv-
ices to them and any other general or specific information regarding the conditions
necessary to habilitation of retarded persons and to provide for consultation with them.
* . . A plan to provide parents and family of the members of the class with continuing
information concerning the effect and the implementation of the Court's decision, con-
cerning the plans to provide all necessary community living arrangements and other
community services to their relative and any other general or specific information regard-
ing the conditions necessary to habilitation of retarded persons and to provide for consul-
tation with them.
446 F. Supp. at 1327.
As the order has been implemented, in addition to having IHP's reviewed every six months
and updated by "all personnel and interested parties [e.g., family members] who are involved
in any and every aspect of the patient's habilitation," transitional individual habilitative pro-
grams have also been developed for members of the plaintiff class to prepare them for life
outside of the institution. Provider Interview, supra note 89. One effect of not affording the
protective provisions of the court's order to the non-class members has been to increase the
weight of the burden now being shouldered by inadequate staffs at CLA's as a result of having
to receive into CLA's non-class members who are generally unprepared for community living,
having spent so much time institutionalized. Id.
On the BSU-level, the members of the plaintiff class have been assigned to special case
managers who are situated in the county administration headquarters where they have access to
the special master as well as state and local officials. Id. Ordinarily, case managers are located in
the BSU's where they have charge of not only the mentally retarded within the geographical
area serviced by the BSU, but also the mentally ill. Id. For a large part of 1980, however, the
caseload of a single case manager at one BSU in Philadelphia County had hovered around 320
clients. Id. Thus, although am effort is being made to provide the plaintiff class with plans for
habilitation programs and other community services designed to be in accord with their federal
statutory rights, far less can be done practically to assist the non-class mentally retarded in
attaining the benefits of their right to an equally adequate habilitation program. Moreover, in
light of the fact that, within the CLA's, there is no differentiation according to class/non-class
members or level of mental development, the practical impact of releasing the non-Pennhurst
patients from the respective institutions without affording them the habilitative advantages
which the former Pennhurst residents receive is to divert staff attention away from the plaintiff
class so that no one is receiving the habilitative opportunities which both the district court and
the Third Circuit in Pennhurst had intended. Id. See note 89 supra.
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mental institutions and, possibly, some mental hospitals. 95  As a result, state
budgetary policies will perforce undergo extensive review in order to refor-
mulate the structures and procedures by which states have heretofore cared
for the mentally handicapped. 96
Probably the most significant impact of the Pennhurst decision will be
upon the communities in which the mentally handicapped are placed.
97
There is no clear reason why the mentally impaired should be segregated
from the rest of society for there are undoubtedly many contributions which
they are able to make toward the good of the whole. But whether the pres-
ence of the mentally handicapped in the general society will present such a
burden that society itself will be shown to be in need of "habilitation," will,
it is submitted, determine in the end just what is the most "appropriate"
environment for the mentally impaired.
Frederick C. Bader
95. See notes 60-68 and accompanying text supra. Such closings, of course, will depend
upon the number of people who, "because of advanced age, profound degree of retardation,
special needs or for some other reason, will not be able to adjust to life outside of an institu-
tion." 612 F.2d at 114.
96. In this regard, the Third Circuit in Pennhurst noted a finding of the district court that
the "per patient cost in CLAs is less than at Pennhurst." 1d. at 116 n.39. It is unclear, however,
whether the court's finding refers to the cost of maintaining an established CLA, or to the cost
of CLA's initial development in addition to its maintenance costs. For a brief discussion of the
sources of funding for CLA's, see notes 56-57 and accompanying text supra.
97. Some communities in southeastern Pennsylvania have resisted the establishment of
CLA's. Philadelphia Inquirer, Sept. 14, 1980, § M, at 4, col. 5. Although members of those
communities accept the deinstitutionalization process in theory as being beneficial for the men-
tally handicapped, they "have fears about the retarded, and they are very suspicious of govern-
ment. They feel that if the government puts retarded people in this year, next year they might
get drug addicts." Id. See Boyd, Strategies in Zoning and Community Living Arrangements for
Retarded Citizens: Parens Patriae Meets Police Power, 25 VILL. L. REV. 273, 277 (1980). To
combat the influx of the mentally retarded, such communities have resorted to the use of local
zoning ordinances of which there are several major types:
Some explicitly exclude such [group] homes from single-family areas, classifying
group homes as a business or medical rather than as a residential use. More commonly, a
city defines a family as a number of persons related by blood, marriage or adoption living
together, and limits the number of unrelated persons who can live in a single dwelling. A
third type of ordinance allows group homes in certain districts only if they first comply
with specified conditions and obtain special permits from the city government.
MENTAL HEALTH LAW PROJECT, COMBATTING EXCLUSIONARY ZONING: THE RIGHT OF
HANDICAPPED PEOPLE TO LIVE IN THE COMMUNITY 1. However, a number of courts through-
out the country have "interpreted the term 'family' in local zoning ordinances to include group
homes for developmentally disabled persons." Id. at 2. For a discussion of the relevant cases,
see id. at 1-25. While a few courts have considered whether a state policy to care for the
handicapped preempts local ordinances which exclude group homes, other courts have required
an explicit state statute preempting local zoning restrictions before permitting group homes to
be established. Id. For a general discussion of community resistance to CLA's in Pennsylvania
through the use of zoning, see Boyd, supra.
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